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Abstract
We report previously undocumented evidence of genetic discrimination by Australian insurance companies, obtained through
direct consumer reports. We surveyed 174 consumers with cancer-predisposing variants, recruited by cancer organisations
Lynch Syndrome Australia and Pink Hope. Questions related to experiences accessing risk-rated insurance after genetic
testing. Results indicate that both legal (permitted under current regulation) and illegal discrimination is occurring. Although
some respondents had not applied for risk-rated insurance, or had insurance in place before genetic testing (n= 100), those
seeking new policies (n= 74) commonly experienced difﬁculties obtaining insurance (86%, 64/74). Of those experiencing
difﬁculties, 50% (32/64) had no prior history or symptoms of cancer, and had undertaken risk reduction through surveillance
and/or preventative surgery. Seventy-seven percent (49/64) reported difﬁculties related to life insurance. Follow-up telephone
interviews with four respondents further described cases of apparent illegal breaches. All reports of discrimination identiﬁed
were, to our knowledge, previously unreported in the literature. The number of cases suggests a systemic problem with the
Australian life insurance industry. We support calls for government oversight of the inherently conﬂicted model of industry
self-regulation in Australia, and an immediate ban on the use of genetic test results in insurance underwriting.
Introduction
In Australia, discrimination on the basis of genetic status is
prohibited by the Disability Discrimination Act 1992(Cth),
but an exception allows insurance discrimination on
actuarial grounds. Insurers can use genetic test results, even
in the absence of disease symptoms, to deny coverage or
impose increased premiums on products such as life,
income protection, permanent disability and travel insur-
ance. However, genetic discrimination must be actuarially
or reasonably justiﬁed. Insurers must consider risk-reducing
measures, including surveillance and surgery. This
requirement creates a distinction between legal genetic
discrimination, where an insurer’s actions are within current
legal regulation (but ethically contentious [1]), and illegal
genetic discrimination—where an insurer’s behaviour is in
breach of a clear regulatory requirement. Private health
insurance, which is community rated in Australia (no indi-
vidual risk assessment), is not affected.
Predictive genetic testing can identify modiﬁable disease
risk, especially for cancer, where life-saving intervention is
possible. Conditions commonly beneﬁting from predictive
testing include Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer syn-
drome (BRCA1/2 genes) and Lynch syndrome, which
increases risk for colon, endometrial and other cancers. Risk-
reduction programs and preventive surgeries are available and
highly effective for both of these conditions. Preventative
surgery in BRCA1/2 carriers (mastectomy/salpingo-
* Jane Tiller
jane.tiller@monash.edu
1 Public Health Genomics, School of Public Health and Preventive
Medicine, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
2 Lynch Syndrome Australia, The Summit, QLD, Australia
3 Pink Hope Community Limited, Narrabeen, NSW, Australia
4 Centre for Health Equity, Melbourne School of Population and
Global Health, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC,
Australia
5 Victorian Clinical Genetics Services, Parkville, VIC, Australia
6 Murdoch Children’s Research Institute, Parkville, VIC, Australia
7 Centre for Law and Genetics, Faculty of Law, University of
Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia
Supplementary information The online version of this article (https://
doi.org/10.1038/s41431-019-0426-1) contains supplementary
material, which is available to authorised users.
Published online: 08 July 2019
12
34
56
78
90
()
;,:
12
34
56
78
90
();
,:
oophorectomy) can reduce risk of breast and/or ovarian can-
cer to below population average [2]. Intensive breast sur-
veillance also reduces risk, with 10-year survival >95% with
magnetic resonance imaging screening [3]. For Lynch syn-
drome, surveillance through colonoscopy and chemopreven-
tion signiﬁcantly reduces colorectal cancer incidence and
mortality [4], and preventative gynaecological surgery sig-
niﬁcantly reduces risk of gynaecological cancer [5].
Previous studies have shown that life insurance compa-
nies in Australia do not always consider risk reduction in
underwriting [6–8]. In addition, several consumers have
recently come forward to the media, reporting difﬁculties
accessing life insurance, even after undergoing risk-reducing
surgery and/or surveillance. In one well-documented case,
involving an application to the Australian Human Rights
Commission, multiple life insurers failed to consider risk
reduction for Lynch syndrome when underwriting [7].
Further evidence indicates consumer fears regarding
insurance deter the uptake of genetic testing and partici-
pation in medical research in Australia [9–12]. In one
study, individuals informed of possible insurance implica-
tions of genetic testing were more than twice as likely to
decline testing as those not informed [10]. This is an
acknowledged barrier to progress in genomic medicine,
compromising Australian medical research [13]. Further,
the current model of industry self-regulation has resulted in
inadequate transparency and limited accountability for
policy breaches [14].
In March 2018, a Parliamentary Joint Committee (PJC)
inquiry into the Australian life insurance industry released
its ofﬁcial report [13], recommending an urgent ban on the
use of predictive genetic test results. The PJC recommended
a ban similar to the UK moratorium, and informed by bans
in other countries [14, 15]. To date, no ban has been
implemented in Australia. The Financial Services Council
(FSC) recently announced an industry-regulated morator-
ium to commence mid-2019, which falls short of the PJC’s
recommendations—it has signiﬁcant ﬁnancial limits and no
government involvement. At the time of writing, the FSC
has commenced consultation on the proposed terms.
Historically, it has been difﬁcult to quantify the scale of
genetic discrimination in Australian insurance, and identify
new cases. Accessing records of underwriting decisions by
life insurers has been difﬁcult, and controlled by the peak
insurer body, the FSC. Data on underwriting has been
periodically made available to researchers for analysis and
resulting publication [8, 16]. However, published datasets
have typically lacked completeness, with limited numbers
of insurers contributing data, and have been signiﬁcantly
out-of-date by publication.
This study aimed to identify previously unreported cases
of genetic discrimination in Australian insurance, through
direct consumer reports.
Materials and methods
We partnered with education and advocacy bodies for indi-
viduals with inherited cancer-predisposing variants: Lynch
Syndrome Australia (LSA) and Pink Hope (PH). These
organisations have broad networks of consumers undertaking
genetic testing. As there is no national register of variant
carriers in Australia, these support organisations provided the
most efﬁcient and direct access to a convenience sample of
consumers who may have experienced difﬁculties accessing
insurance products after genetic testing.
Our sequential mixed-methods study was descriptive and
exploratory. It comprised an online survey designed to iden-
tify experiences of discrimination on the basis of genetic test
results by insurance companies, followed by targeted tele-
phone interviews to describe selected consumer experiences
in greater detail. Products offered by life insurance companies
(including life, income protection and disability insurance,
collectively referred to hereafter as “life insurance products”)
were of primary interest in this study. However, we also
included reports of discrimination in other risk-rated insur-
ance, including mortgage protection and travel insurance.
Health insurance, which is community rated, was excluded.
The ﬁrst survey draft was developed collaboratively with
LSA, and then adapted for PH members. While covering the
same topics, the surveys were modiﬁed slightly between the
groups to better capture relevant information. Questions
included demographics, relevant medical details, variant
detected, prior cancer diagnoses, relatives affected, risk-
reducing surveillance/surgery, and insurance experiences
(Supplementary Materials). At the end of the survey,
respondents were asked whether they would be willing to be
re-contacted by researchers to discuss experiences further.
Follow-up telephone interviews (semi-structured) were
conducted with a limited number of respondents, and were
designed to gather more in-depth data on consumer reports
of genetic discrimination, particularly related to suspected
breaches of current policy.
Surveys were distributed by email and social media to
LSA and PH group members, to reach a convenience
sample of consumers likely to have experienced insurance
discrimination after genetic testing. LSA sent one email and
promoted on social media once. PH promoted the survey on
social media twice. Semi-structured follow-up telephone
interviews were designed to collect more detail from a small
subset of the respondents who consented to re-contact.
Follow-up respondents were selected on the basis of the
type of discrimination reported in the survey. We prioritised
respondents who reported what appeared to be illegal dis-
crimination, characterised by a failure of insurance com-
panies to consider risk-reducing surgery. Our aim was not to
reach saturation but to gather more data on speciﬁc cases of
illegal discrimination.
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Data analysis involved descriptive statistics of survey
responses. Follow-up interviews were recorded and ana-
lysed to describe the key features of respondents’ experi-
ences. The project was approved by the Alfred Human
Research Ethics Committee, number 332/18.
Results
LSA emailed its survey to 550 members, then promoted via
social media with an estimated reach of 700–800 people,
based on metrics reports (September–October 2017). PH
promoted its survey via social media in March and April
2018 (estimated reach of 2540). Due to the online recruit-
ment method, overall survey response rates could not be
calculated.
We received completed surveys from 214 respondents.
Respondents without cancer-predisposing variants and those
from outside Australia were excluded. The resulting 174
respondents comprised the ﬁnal data set (summary results
Table 1). The majority were female (91%), and aged 40–60
years (55%). The most common variant was BRCA1 (23%).
Many respondents who obtained insurance did so before
genetic testing (55%, 61/110). Another 22% (39/110)
reported no attempt to obtain insurance. Of the remainder
(n= 74), 86% (64/74) experienced difﬁculty obtaining risk-
rated insurance after having genetic testing (Table 1). This
included denials of cover (n= 45) or premiums increased
above standard rates (n= 16), with three participants not
disclosing the type of difﬁculty. Of these, 77% (49/64)
experienced difﬁculty obtaining life insurance products.
Of those who reported difﬁculties, 50% (32/64) had no
personal cancer history and reported risk reduction (regular
surveillance and/or preventative surgery). These represented
possible cases of illegal discrimination (for details see
Supplementary Table S1). Only 9% (6/64) of respondents
who had difﬁculty reported appealing the insurer’s decision.
LSA participants were asked speciﬁc questions about rea-
sons for not appealing, and of those who did not appeal the
insurer’s decision, 50% (21/42) said they did not know that
this was an option (Table S1).
Of the PH respondents without preventative surgery
(n= 17), all but one were in high-risk breast surveillance. All
LSA respondents without bowel cancer (n= 57) had regular
colonoscopy. Of those who obtained life insurance products
after testing (n= 10), none had a prior history of cancer, and
all had some preventative surgery and/or regular surveillance.
Seventy-one respondents agreed to re-contact for follow-
up, 29 of whom had reported difﬁculty accessing life
insurance products. Resource limitations precluded inter-
viewing all 29 respondents. Four respondents were chosen
for interviews, whose reported circumstances indicated that
risk-reducing measures had not been considered by life
insurance companies in underwriting. All four case studies
demonstrated aspects of failure by insurers to consider risk
Table 1 Summary results from consumer surveys
Total PH LSA
Total survey respondents, N= 174
All 174 74 100
Gender (female) 158 74 84
Age (years)
Under 40 61 38 23
40–60 95 32 63
Over 60 18 4 14
Genetic risk variant
MLH1 25 – 25
MSH2 27 – 27
MSH6 16 – 16
PMS2 12 – 12
Other/unsure 22 2 20
BRCA1 41 41 –
BRCA2 31 31 –
Willing to discuss experiences by phone 71 45 26
Difﬁculty accessing life insurance product 29 7 22
Took part in follow-up interview 4 2 2
Reported difﬁculty accessing insurance, N= 64
All 64 18 46
Type (multiple possible per respondent)
Life insurance products Total 49 12 37
Life insurance 39 9 30
Income protection insurance 31 6 25
Disability insurance 20 5 15
Mortgage insurance 11 1 10
Travel insurance 8 8 –
Personal history of cancer 32 10 22
No personal history of cancer, in high-risk
surveillance and/or had preventive surgerya
32 8 24
Appealed insurer’s decision 6 2 4
Did not report appealing insurer’s decision 58 16 42
Did not know appeal was an option – – 21
Other/did not answer question – 21
Did not report difﬁculty accessing insurance, N= 110
All 110 56 54
Obtained life insurance at standard rates
after genetic testing
10 3 7
Obtained travel insurance at standard rates
after genetic testing
13 13 –
Already had insurance prior to testing 61 30 31
Did not attempt to obtain insurance/did not
answer the question
39 24 15
Dashed ﬁelds (–) indicate questions not asked or not relevant
aPossible breaches of the industry code and Disability Discrimination
Act 1992 (Cth)
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reduction. Due to space constraints, and the overlap in
issues raised in the four case studies, three were selected to
present the experiences of this group (Table 2). We sought
pro-bono legal advice regarding Case 1 and Case 3, as they
took place in 2018 and were considered the most suitable
for legal challenge. We received an initial indication that
they could both have grounds for legal challenge on the
basis that the insurer was reported to have failed to consider
risk reduction in making an adverse decision.
Discussion
Of 64 individuals reporting genetic discrimination by
insurers, we identiﬁed 32 individuals reporting experiences
of arguably illegal genetic discrimination. Based on initial
consideration, legal remedies could be pursued in several of
these cases.
Difﬁculties accessing insurance after genetic testing were
common in the surveyed population. Strikingly, half of all
respondents reporting difﬁculties accessing insurance had
no personal cancer history and were following recom-
mended guidelines for cancer prevention, often reducing
risk below population average [2–4], yet they still had
policies denied and premiums loaded, without actuarial
justiﬁcation. The limited knowledge of the appeals process
reinforces earlier research regarding barriers to uptake of
legal remedies [17].
Although some respondents did not report difﬁculty
obtaining insurance, very few actually obtained life insur-
ance products at standard rates after receiving a positive
genetic test result. Many reported having some insurance in
place before having testing, consistent with common pre-test
genetic counselling discussions in Australia, regarding
considering life insurance before having genetic testing [18].
Discriminating on genetic test results penalises indivi-
duals who are proactive about health. By contrast, those
who remain uninformed of their risk are not penalised in the
same way. Almost all respondents in this cohort took sig-
niﬁcant steps to reduce their risks of cancer after receiving
positive genetic test results. This suggests at-risk consumers
who are members of organisations like PH and LSA are
motivated to reduce risk, rather than prioritise seeking
higher levels of life insurance, although participants were
not directly asked this question. This is consistent with a US
study showing women with BRCA1/2 variants did not
purchase more life insurance than untested women [19].
This would need to be tested in a larger sample to conﬁrm
whether this holds at the population level.
In many cases, individuals bear the costs of proactive risk
mitigation, but can still be ﬁnancially disadvantaged by dis-
criminatory insurance underwriting. Although insurers are
legally obliged to consider risk reduction, this study indicates
that in many cases, they do not. This means that not only are
individuals choosing not to have predictive testing, but fur-
ther, their subsequent lack of access to preventative measures
has potential negative effects on their health and life expec-
tancy. If insurers were to accept a ban as recommended, it
would encourage at-risk individuals to take steps to mitigate
their risk, making claims less likely [1].
Legal and illegal discrimination
These and other social policy reasons support an argument
that even the legal genetic discrimination identiﬁed should
not be allowed [1]. A ban on the use of genetic test results
by insurers, as applied in many other countries and
recommended by the Australian PJC [13], would protect
consumers from all genetic discrimination in life insurance
and allow individuals to pursue genetic testing and parti-
cipate in research without insurance fears. It is important to
note that the recommended ban would not apply to family
history information, only genetic test results. Further, the
recommended ban would allow the use of genetic test
results to counter a negative family history (i.e. to show that
an individual does not have a genetic variant that runs in the
family and contributes to a family history of disease).
In at least 50% of the cases of discrimination reported,
insurers failed to consider risk-reducing measures, con-
sistent with illegal genetic discrimination. If substantiated,
these cases would indicate insurer disregard for existing
regulations, and minimal accountability for breaches of
current regulatory requirements. Government oversight and
stricter penalties are required to ensure compliance within a
self-regulated industry. Legal remedies for insurance dis-
crimination ﬂow from federal and state anti-discrimination
legislation [17]. However, the appeal pathway is unclear
and the cost of legal advice can be prohibitive, meaning
available legal remedies are often not pursued by affected
consumers [7, 17]. In our study, only 9% of affected con-
sumers appealed adverse decisions.
Limitations
Our survey relied on consumer self-reports, and investiga-
tors did not have access to primary insurance documenta-
tion to verify reports of discrimination. Differences between
the LSA/PH surveys resulted in some differences in data
collected, and the total reach of the survey could not be
calculated accurately due to online advertising methods. We
provided our best estimate, based on reported social media
statistics. Recruitment through support networks may have
resulted in participant bias towards proactive individuals.
While this bias is acknowledged and may limit the gen-
eralisability of some results, the number of discrimination
cases identiﬁed remains pertinent. We accept that the
Genetic discrimination by Australian insurance companies: a survey of consumer experiences
sample is likely more educated, computer savvy and
resourceful than the general population, and more likely to
be aware of and report genetic discrimination. In our view,
the extent of discrimination experienced by those without
those characteristics (who are not even aware that dis-
crimination is occurring) is underestimated by this study.
This study provides an up-to-date description of reported
cases of genetic discrimination in Australian risk-rated
insurance, with a particular focus on life insurance. We
reached only a fraction of possibly affected consumers,
likely underestimating the scale of the problem and future
research could survey a broader range of consumers. Our
ﬁndings highlight the material impact on consumers
experiencing both legal and illegal discrimination by Aus-
tralian insurers. In light of the documented adverse impact
of insurance concerns on uptake of clinical testing and
research participation, the ﬁndings support calls for an
immediate ban on the use of genetic test results in under-
writing in Australia, and greater government oversight.
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